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Abstract 
In a period of declining demand, should we sustain some intercity transport even if it is unprofitable? And in which situations 
should we sustain the plurality of modes of transport? In this paper, we analyze the relationship between time-value distribution 
and multi-modal network shapes. The network shapes considered are dual-mode or single-mode, and a random parameter model 
is used to describe the route choice of travelers, which takes the time-value distribution into account. First, the relationship 
between parameters of time-value distribution (i.e., average and dispersion) and the optimal network shape is analyzed; we find 
that a dual-mode network is optimal when the time-value dispersion is large. Second, as demand declines, the optimal network 
may change from a dual-mode network to a single-mode network. Third, the conditions in which an equilibrium dual-mode 
network can be established in a given transport market are described. From a comparison between the equilibrium and optimal 
conditions for a dual-mode network, we find that dual-mode networks may be in equilibrium even though they are not optimal. It 
follows that we need not sustain unprofitable mode service in order to realize the optimal network shape. Moreover, in a period 
of declining demand, it may be beneficial to move from a dual-mode network to a single-mode network from a market driven 
dual-mode network. 
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1. Introduction 
The demand for intercity travel in Japan is currently decreasing because of a diminishing population. This decline 
in demand may result in some public transport operations becoming unprofitable, particularly in rural areas. In Japan, 
some unprofitable intercity transport services are supported by government subsidies, but it may not be practical to 
sustain all transport services forever. In particular, with a multi-modal network, some services may no longer be 
required. The relationships between some modes (e.g., high-speed rail (HSR) and air travel) have become 
increasingly competitive because of appearance of low-cost carriers and/or the construction of HSR. This means that 
we can make the intercity transport network more efficient by cancelling some services without seriously affecting 
the regional economy, because competitive modes can cover the terminated service. 
In some cases, however, it may be socially efficient to sustain dual-mode networks, considering the heterogeneity 
in travelers’ preference (i.e., their time-value) and congestion. First, in the case of larger heterogeneity in travelers’ 
preference, it may be socially optimal to sustain dual-mode networks, in which they can choose their favorite mode. 
For example, when travelers have both high and low time-value, the optimal network is often dual-mode, and 
passengers can choose different modes: a fast but expensive service, or a slow but inexpensive service. Therefore, it 
is important to determine the relationships between the heterogeneity of travelers’ preferences and optimal network 
shape for intercity transport. Second, when transport is limited by congestion, we should sustain a dual-mode 
network. However, in Japan congestion is not a significant problem because of the declining population (with a few 
notable exceptions, for example, Haneda Airport in Tokyo). 
Few studies into intercity public transport have focused on heterogeneity in travelers’ preferences. Many 
theoretical studies involving airline networks (e.g., Brueckner (2004) and Flores-Fillol (2009)) assume that travelers’ 
preferences are identical. Adler et al. (2010) considered the heterogeneity of travelers stochastically using a nested 
multinomial Logit model, but they did not analyze the relationship between variance in travelers’ preferences and the 
network shape. 
Kawasaki (2008) analyzed airline networks to consider two types of travelers: business travelers with high time-
value, and leisure travelers with low time-value. He concluded that, in the case of large heterogeneity, the optimal 
strategy for airlines is to operate two types of service: high-frequency services (i.e., a hub-and-spoke network) for 
business travelers and low-frequency but direct services (i.e., a point-to-point network) for leisure travelers. 
In this paper, we first examine the robustness of Kawasaki’s 2008 analysis by considering a multi-modal network 
with different cost functions and time-value distributions. The time-value distribution is assumed to be a uniform 
distribution with a certain range, in contrast to the assumption that there are two types of travelers, each with a single 
time-value. Second, the optimal network shapes are analyzed in response to a decline in demand. Third, optimal and 
equilibrium networks in a transport markets with a given set of time-value distributions are compared. As a result of 
these analyses, we find that 1) a dual-mode network is optimal when the time-value dispersion is large, in agreement 
with the results of Kawasaki (2008); 2) in a period of declining demand, the optimal network may change from dual-
mode to single-mode; and 3) based on a comparison between the optimal and equilibrium networks, we find that a 
dual-mode network may be in equilibrium even though it is not optimal. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we describe the model used to analyze the 
relationship between the time-value distribution and the network shape. In Chapter 3 we present the results of our 
analyses of a typical setting: the network shape is either single-mode or dual-mode, and the time-value distribution is 
assumed to be uniform and limited to a given range. Chapter 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Model 
In this chapter, we describe the models used to analyze the relationship between the time-value distribution, and 
the optimal and equilibrium network shapes. The model consists of a description of the travelers’ route choice and a 
description of the network, in which public transport operators determine link fares and the network shape. In 
section 2.1 we describe the travelers’ route choice model; in Section 2.2 we describe the network model to analyze 
the optimal network shape; and in Section 2.3 we describe the network model for analysis of the equilibrium 
network shape. 
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2.1. Travelers’ route choice model 
In the travelers’ route choice model, we assume that a traveler chooses a route k  with the lowest generalized cost, 
,i kGC . We assumed that ,i kGC  is the sum of the route fare kf  and route time kT  multiplied by the time value iv  of 
traveler i  where all link services consisting of route k  are operated. This may be formulated as follows: 
 
  ,min rsk K i kGC ,           (1) 
  s.t. ,
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where rsK  is the set of routes, kQ  is the link set included in route k , and {0,1}lG   is the existence of link services, 
where 1lG   corresponds to a link that operates and 0lG   corresponds to a link that does not. From the 
distribution density of the time-value relation ( )g v , and from Equations (1) and (2), the number of travelers on 
route k  is given by: 
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is the traveler density of route k  for a given time-value v . 
This model is similar to the random parameter model proposed by Walker and Ben-Akiva (2002) in the way it 
treats the time-value distribution, but our model does not include random disturbances for each traveler (which are 
usually assumed to follows a Weibull distribution). As a result of the absence of such a random disturbance, 
travelers with the same time-value relation choose the same route. 
2.2. Optimal network model 
In the optimal network model, we assume that a public transport operator manages all links, determines the link 
fares lf , and determines the existence of link services, lG . The optimal network is one that minimizes the total 
generalized cost ,TCf δ . To minimize ,TCf δ , the network operator should maximize the total benefit for travelers 
under the conditions of fixed demand. This can be formulated as follows: 
 
, , 0
min ( ) ( )k kkTC h v GC v dv
f ¦ ³f δ f δ ,          (5) 
 
s.t. Equations (2)-(4), 
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Here, Equation (6) is a non-negative constraint of the public transport operator’s profit. The left-hand side of 
Equation (6) is the total fare receipts, and the right-hand side is the total operating cost. The cost of link  l  is 
assumed to be the sum of the fixed-cost lE  and unit variable cost lC  multiplied by the number of travelers lp . 
Equations (7)-(9) are constraints that describe the relationship between the route variables and the link variables. 
2.3. Equilibrium network model 
The equilibrium network model assumes that each public transport operator for each link determines the link 
fares lf  and existence of link services {0,1}lG   in order to minimize their profit lS  independently. This is 
formulated as follows: 
 
   ^ `,min l lf l l l l l l lf p E C pG S G            (10) 
 
s.t. Equations (2)-(4), (7)-(9). 
 
In section 3.5, Nash Equilibrium of non-cooperative game theory is analyzed to determine the network shape that is 
established in the transport market without government subsidies. 
3. Theoretical Results for Typical Setting 
3.1. Settings 
In this section, the relationship between the time-value distribution and the network shape is analyzed in single- 
and dual-mode cases, which are shown in Fig. 1. There are three possible network shape: an air-only (AO) network, 
as shown in Fig. 2(a); a rail-only (RO) network, as shown in Fig. 2(b); and a dual-mode or hybrid (HB) network as 
shown in Fig. 2(c). 
 
䠫
䠠
Link-R (Railway)
Link-A (Airline)
 
Fig. 1. Network setting 
䠫
䠠
(c) HB network(a) AO network (b) RO network
䠫
䠠
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䠠
 
Fig. 2. All network shapes 
 
As shown in Fig. 1, we can treat the two modes, air and rail, by considering some characteristics of each mode. 
We make the following three assumptions: 1) the air travel time AT  is shorter than the rail travel time RT ; 2) the 
fixed cost of rail travel RE  is greater than that of air travel AE , 3) the unit variable cost (per seat) of the railway RC  
is less than that of the airline AC . We then have: 
 
    A RT T ,           (11) 
 
    A RE E ,          (12) 
 
    A RC C! .          (13) 
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The time-value distribution is assumed to be uniform within a limited range. This can be expressed as follows: 
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a v a v
a v a v
d d v d dx
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,        (14) 
 
where x  is the distribution density of the time-value, ad  is the average of time-value distribution, and vd  indicates 
the dispersion of the time-value distribution, which is subject to the following constraints: 
 
   0 0a v a v v ad d d d d d      䋽㻌 ,        (15) 
 
i.e., the time-value should be non-negative. This is time-value distribution is plotted in Fig. 3. 
 
time value
distribution density 
 
Fig. 3. The assumed time-value distribution. 
 
Here, we assumed a fixed demand case, whereby the total number of travelers D  is constraint. It follows that x  
may be found from: 
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3.2. Route choice results in HB network 
In this section we analyze the number of travelers on routes A  and R , i.e., Ap  and Rp  in HB network. As 
described by Equation (4), all travelers with same time-value choose the same route. Therefore, in an HB network, 
travelers with a time-value greater than 'v  use air travel, where 'v  is the time-value at which the generalized cost of 
the railway is equal to that of the airline, i.e.: 
 
   ( ') ( ') ' A RR A
R A
f fGC v GC v v
T T
   䋽㻌 .        (17) 
 
These route choice data are plotted in Fig. 4. 
 
’
Rail User Air User
time value
distribution density
 
Fig. 4. Route choice of passengers as a function of time-value. 
 
The numbers of travelers on each route can be described by a linear function of the fares of the two modes, Af  
and Rf , i.e.: 
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and: 
R Ap D p  .          (19) 
 
Because the number of travelers on each route is given by a linear function of the fare, the total generalized cost 
,TCf δ  and profit lS  for the operators are quadratic functions of the fares. We can therefore solve the fares for the 
optimal and equilibrium networks analytically. 
3.3. Optimal network results 
In this section, the optimal network shape for a pair of average time-value ad  and time-value dispersion vd  is 
determined by comparing the minimum total generalized costs for each network shape (i.e., * ,AOTCf , * ,ROTCf  and 
* ,HB
TC
f
). From Equations (2)-(6), (14), and (16), the minimum total generalized cost for an AO network is: 
 
   * ,AO A A a ATC E C D d T D  f ,         (20) 
 
and for an RO network we have: 
 
   * ,RO R R a RTC E C D d T D  f .         (21) 
 
From Equations (2)-(6), (14), and (16)-(19), optimal fares *Af , 
*
Rf   that minimizing the total generalized cost are as 
follows: 
 
  * A RA A
E Ef C
D
  ,          (22) 
 
and: 
  * A RR R
E Ef C
D
  ,          (23) 
 
which leads to the following total generalized cost for a hybrid network: 
 
   * '*,HB 'a v a v
d d v
A R A A R R A Rv d d
TC E E p C C DC vT xdv vT xdv

      ³ ³f .      (24) 
 
By comparing * ,AOTCf , * ,ROTCf  and * ,HBTCf , we can obtain the optimal network shape for a pair of average time-
value ad  and dispersion vd  as shown in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5. The optimal network shape for the pair of average time-value ad  and dispersion vd  
 
The boundary lines of Fig. 5 are as follows: 
 
      * *,AO ,RO
A R R A
a
R A
C C D E E
TC TC d
T T D
    f f  䋽㻌 ,         (25) 
 
   * *,AO ,HB 2 A A Ra v vR A R A
E C CTC TC d d d
D T T T T
    f f  䋽㻌 ,        (26) 
 
and: 
   * *,RO ,HB 2 A A Ra v vR A R A
E C CTC TC d d d
D T T T T
     f f  䋽㻌 .       (27) 
 
First, it is evident from Fig. 5 that, with a larger average time-value, an AO network is optimal. Second, with 
lower average time-value, an RO network is optimal. The HB network is only optimal with a relatively large time-
value dispersion. In other words, an HB network is effective in reducing the time lost for high time-value travelers 
and in reducing the variable cost for low time-value travelers. 
We can determine the total operational cost of the optimal network using Equations (22) and (23) which is equal 
to total fare revenue, i.e.: 
 
     * * * * * *A A R R A A A R R Rf p f p C p E C p E     .        (28) 
 
It follows that the profits from one of these modes will be negative, unless ad  and vd  satisfy the relation: 
 
   * * * 0 R A A RA A A A A a v
R A R A
E E C Cf p C p E d d
E E T T
        䋽㻌 ,        (29) 
 
i.e., the profits of both modes are zero. In other words, in the optimal HB network, the deficit of unprofitable mode 
is just subsidized by the other mode’s profit. 
3.4. Optimal network after demand decline 
Fig. 6(a) shows the shift in the boundary lines of shown in Fig. 5 (which were determined from Equations (25)-
(27)) due to a decline in the total demand. As a result of these shifts in the boundary lines, the optimal network 
shape changes in some areas, as shown in Fig. 6(b). 
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Fig. 6. The changes in the optimal network shape due to declining demand. (a) Changes in response to shifts in Equations 
(25)-(27). (b) The change in the optimal network shape. 
 
It is evident from the data plotted in Fig. 6(b) that the optimal network shape changes from an RO network to an AO 
network in area (A). Because of the declining demand, the generalized cost per traveler increases, and the AO 
network, with its lower fixed cost, becomes optimal. In area (B), the optimal network changed from an HB network 
to an AO network, and in area (C) it changed to an RO network. As a consequence, the area corresponding to an HB 
network being optimal becomes smaller, due to the larger fixed cost. 
We validate these analytical results by numerical tests of 3 cases which are plotted in Fig. 6(a). The results are 
shown in Table 1. In this test, parameters (i.e., the number of travelers, fixed cost, and unit variable cost) are set as 
follows: 
 
total number of traveler before the declining demand D = 1000 (person); total number of travelers after the declining 
demand 'D = 600 (person); AE = 100,000 (yen); RE = 200,000 (yen); AC = 6,000 (yen per person); RC = 3,000 (yen 
per person); AT = 60 (min); RT = 120 (min). 
 
From Table 1, it can be observed that the generalized cost per traveler increase because of the declining demand. In 
the case [2] which is plotted in area (B) (Fig. 6), optimal network shape changes from an HB network to AO 
network. 
 
Table 1. Numerical tests of the changes in the optimal network shape due to declining demand.  
Parameters of Time Value Distribution 
* ,AO
TC D
f
 
(yen per person) 
* ,RO
TC D
f
 
(yen per person) 
* ,HB
TC D
f
 
(yen per person) 
Optimal 
network shape  ad  
(yen/min) 
vd  
(yen/min) 
The number of 
demand 
[1] 50 40 
Before the decline 9,100 9,200 8,700 HB network 
After the decline 9,200 9,400 9,000 HB network 
[2] 65 40 
Before the decline 10,000 11,000 9,966 HB network 
After the decline 10,100 11,200 10,266 AO network 
[3] 65 20 
Before the decline 10,000 11,000 10,181 AO network 
After the decline 10,100 11,200 10,481 AO network 
3.5. Equilibrium network results 
In this section, we describe the conditions in which an HB network can be established in the transport market, i.e., 
is in equilibrium, and compare this with the conditions whereby an HB network is optimal. An HB network can 
exhibit Nash equilibrium under three conditions. First, each of the transport operators cannot increase their profit by 
changing their fare, i.e.: 
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  0A
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Sw  w , 0
R
Rf
Sw  w ,         (30) 
 
Second, the profits of all transport operators are positive, i.e.: 
 
  0AS t , 0RS t ,          (31) 
 
Third, the number of travelers in each mode is positive, i.e.: 
 
  0, 0 A RA R a v a v
R A
f fp p d d d d
T T
! !    䚷 㻌䋽㻌 .        (32) 
 
From Equations (30)-(32), (2)-(4), (10), and (14)-(19), we can determine two conditions whereby a Nash 
equilibrium is achieved. These are as follows: 
 
   
2
0 3 3 A A RA a v v
R A R A
E C Cd d d
D T T T T
S t !     䋽㻌         (33) 
 
and: 
   
2
0 3 3 R A RR a v v
R A R A
E C Cd d d
D T T T T
S t !    䋽㻌 .         (34) 
 
Fig. 7(a) shows these conditions as a function of the average time-value and the time-value dispersion, 
illustrating the region whereby an HB network is in Nash equilibrium. From Fig. 7(a), we can see that when the 
time-value dispersion is large, an HB network is in Nash equilibrium. Fig. 7(b) shows that an HB network that is 
optimal is also realized as Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, an HB network may be in Nash equilibrium, but not 
always optimal. It follows that there are some cases whereby we can make the intercity transport network more 
efficient by cancelling one mode, thereby reducing the fixed cost. 
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Fig. 7. (a) The Range of average time-value and time-value dispersions whereby an HB network exhibits Nash equilibrium. 
(b) A comparison with the range over with an HB network is optimal. 
4. Conclusion 
We investigated the relationships between time-value distribution and multi-modal intercity transport networks, 
where the random parameter model was used for route choice. From an analysis of the relationships between time-
value distribution and the optimal network shape, we find that a hybrid (i.e., dual mode) network is optimal when 
time-value dispersion is large. Following a decline in demand, in many cases the optimal network shape changed 
611 Hiromichi Yamaguchi and Makoto Okumura /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  138 ( 2014 )  602 – 611 
from a hybrid to a single-mode network, due to the reduced fixed cost of a single-mode network. The conditions 
whereby a dual-mode network can be established in Nash equilibrium were investigated. We find that a dual-mode 
network can exist in Nash equilibrium even when it is not optimal. 
From these results, we can conclude that dual-mode networks should be sustained when the time-value dispersion 
is large. However, as demand declines, the optimal network may change to one with lower fixed costs. Furthermore, 
because a dual-mode network may be in Nash equilibrium even though it is not optimal, in some cases it may be 
beneficial to change to a single-mode network. 
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